


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L E T T E R

T O T H E

Right Honourable Author

O F A

LETTER to a CITIZEN.

[Price One Shilling and Sixpence.]



A
L E T T E R

T O T H E

Right Honourable Author

O F A

L E T T E R to a C I T I Z E N,

W I T H

Animadversions on the A N S W E R thereto,

And on the Behaviour of the

Corporation of the City of L O N D O N.

I N W H I C H

His Reasons for resigning; the Conduct,
Success and Advantages of his Admini-
stration; his Fidelity to his Country;
Capacity for directing the Transactions of
War, Commerce and Pacification, are
fairly stated and freely considered.

Cognitiones capitalium rerum, sine consiliis
per se solus exercebat.

LIV. de Tarquinio Superbo.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. HINXMAN, in Pater-noster Row.

M D C C L X I.



A

L E T T E R, &c.

S I R,

HAD your letter to a citizen of London, printed in the daily papers, tended to nothing farther than a justification of your conduct in resigning the seals, it would have remained unexamined by me, and neither yourself nor the public would have been troubled with perusing the following reflections thereupon. But when there appears so manifest an inclination to possess the minds of the people with suggestions so injurious to those who dissented from you in opinion, and, I am afraid, to Majesty itself, such unequal motives to so illiberal a treatment, and such defect of argument in support of such behaviour, I should think myself wanting in duty to the best of kings, to the preservation of national tranquility, and to that sense of justice which ought to animate the bosoms of all men, in passing it by unnoticed.

B

The

The passage which, to my apprehension, seems fraught with inflammatory design, and bears so hard on the whole council, except yourself and lord T----- is this : “ A difference in opinion with regard to the measures to be taken against Spain of the highest importance to the honour of the crown, and to the most essential national interests, and this founded on what Spain had already done, not on what that court may farther do, was the cause of my resigning the seals.”

This, then, is undoubtedly an insinuation amounting in fact to a charge, that the whole council, yourself and lord T----- excepted, are the avowed favourers of measures destructive of the honour and welfare of the kingdom ; and that you Right Honourable pair of Brothers are the sole surviving friends of England, of all those servants who have the honour of being nearest to the throne.

So grievous and so ignoble a suggestion, certainly deserves to have been founded on a stronger base than what you have been pleased to assign it. A minister who appeals to the public in defence of his measures, and expects a justification therefrom, ought to have been more explicit in his account. You certainly should have stated the subject
which

which was debated in council, the arguments which were brought by you, at least, in support of your dissention, and the nature of that offence which Spain has already committed, that the nation, whose upright and candid judgment you tell us you revere, might have been enabled to judge whether the conduct of that court hath been such as may warrant the proceedings which you advised, and justify your difference in opinion from the rest of the council, and the resignation which you have made: this would have appeared like the behaviour of a man who appealed for the sake of justice.

But it seems you have chosen a more Laconic manner, and like the Pontifex Maximus at Rome, expect the nation shall implicitly believe that whatever you propose must be advantageous, just and honourable; that your judgment is infallible, and that all who oppose your measures are either men of weak intellects, or insidious hearts: for the creating a belief of one, and probably of both these opinions, appears to be the consequence you expect from this publication of your letter.

But unhappily for you, Sir, though the council should be guilty of all that you suggest, of the contrary of which I am convinced, even that circumstance, though it

may justify your difference in sentiments, can not palliate your resignation. Men of such characters ought to be watched with the utmost vigilance, their misdeeds remarked, the depravity of their hearts and intellects attempted to be corrected, and the iniquity of their measures indicated to your sovereign, who would certainly have followed that counsel which is most salutary to the state ; though you certainly, indirectly, accuse him of the contrary, by shewing, that he declined complying with what you offered. This had been the duty of a man who loves his king and country ; a duty to which he is more especially called as the danger of mischief becomes greater from the administration of those into whose hands he resigned it, and for the desertion of which he can never be excused in the judgments of men of understanding. But you, Sir, have usurped the right of being the sole judge of the honour and interest of the realm, and even exclude your king. But since you have declined explaining the cause of your retirement, you will permit me to lay down what on very good grounds hath been said to be the cause of it. It was your admonition, it seems, that an English fleet should be sent to the port of Cadiz, and peremptorily demand that the Spaniard should

should desist from assisting the French in any manner; which, if they refused, the navy of England was immediately to lay waste all that was within their reach.

Should not you, Sir, have explained the conduct of the Spaniard, respecting this realm, which is at once so atrocious and unknown to those before whom you lay your case, that they might have decided whether an act, so contradictory to the laws of nature and of nations as that of committing hostilities in so flagrant a manner before the declaration of war, can be countenanced or not thereby: or, do you imagine, that your name can give sanction to measures which are condemned by all who are susceptible of honourable sensations. Would you have persuaded your sovereign to the commission of such an act in such early days of reigning? His royal bosom was fraught with nobler sentiments. I am afraid the kingdom hath already suffered in her ancient characteristic of integrity by the precipitate depredations which were committed on the French, and we need no farther endeavours to diminish her honour. But, thank heaven, the date of such proceeding is expired.

It is easily discerned that this opinion of yours has been adopted in obedience to that search of popular applause, which hath been
so

so egregiously manifested in all your conduct, for securing the approbation of the undiscerning multitude, which delights in atrocious acts, however criminal, and conciliating favour in the minds of men, who, stung to madness by the contagious lust of acquiring riches by any means, however unwarrantable, are already too much possessed with the pyratie spirit of violating all laws, both human and divine, to stand in need of farther encouragement. Let it be imagined, however, that this Machiavelian principle of national conduct is to be vindicated, and that success justifies the commission of any act which one state may commit against another, however subversive of the laws of nations, will it support the conduct of a minister where ruin must inevitably follow the most uninterrupted conquests.

Let it be granted that the fleet of England had perpetrated all that your most sanguine conception may have imagined it to be capable of doing: is the blood of thousands to be lavished, and the subjects to be harraressed with debts and taxes, till they can no longer move beneath the load; and even that commerce rescinded by oppressive imposts, which must speedily render all things too dear to find a market in foreign realms, and even in our own colonies, since under
such

such circumstances, no power has hitherto been able to prevent illicit trade: and thus whilst we are engaged in wars in pretence of supporting commerce, divest ourselves by those very means of the power of long enjoying it. This indeed would be a strange event of victory, and such must the event inevitably be by a continuation of war.

Is it therefore worth while to break with Spain, and sacrifice the honour of the nation for the sake of enriching privateers, especially as that opportunity will discontinue in six months; or of loading with immense fortunes, contractors for naval stores and other necessaries of war; stock-jobbers, the pest of the nation; remittancers and men who undertake on lucrative views alone to furnish and augment those public loans, which already weigh so heavy on the labour of the honest and industrious: and yet all these mischiefs are to be continued, because it is the opinion of you and Lord T-----. Might not a man aswisely renounce the direction of the whole faculty of physic, and resign his health to the care of a mountebank and his toad-eater.

Whether this violent attack on Spain was or was not the proceeding on which you insisted, will make but little difference in your favour; it was incontrovertably some measure
which

which both his majesty and his privy-council, yourself, and Lord T----- excepted, unanimously disapproved of; and this you say you are sure no gentleman will contradict. I am sure also that no man gentle or simple, who dislikes your conduct, will contradict it; for what could the most malicious fiend have suggested more repugnant to the intent of justifying your resignation, than that it was done because the king and council would not implicitly obey your dictates. And I fancy before the citizen may have read through this answer, he may have cause to be confounded at his virulent adoption of your cause, if such a character be susceptible of confusion.

But happily for all who might have an inclination to contradict you, you have generously saved them that trouble, and have done it for yourself; for farther on in your letter you say, "You resigned the seals in order not to remain responsible for measures which you were no longer allowed to guide." Now, Sir, it is manifest that the subject of your guiding, or not guiding, as you express it, formed no part of the debate relative to the conduct that was to be observed with Spain, nor of your cause of resignation; it was, whether you should or not dictatorially fix the measures which were to be guided; there

There was no dispute concerning guidance, and no attempt to divest you of that province; and unless you can make the orders of the merchant who plans the voyage, and the duty of the captain who guides the ship; the commands of the master who determines what journey he will take, and the business of the coachman who guides the horses, to be one and the same thing; have not you indisputably contradicted yourself? and this too you tell us you have done only for the honour of truth. Certainly, Sir, you have strange ideas of truth, and very little solicitude for her honour.

Since then it is evident from your own words, that the cause of your resignation was not owing to your being deprived of the power of guiding the measures which may be taken, but of imposing such as shall be undertaken. I shall take the liberty, not of contradicting you because you cannot bear such treatment, and I would not commit so ungentlemanlike an action, but of returning to the latter of those reasons,

You say, your opinion was unanimously overruled by the united opinion of the king's council, and therefore you resigned the seals. By putting it in that manner, you have endeavoured to avert the eyes of the nation from discerning the true cause. But they

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must

must be weak indeed, who cannot see through this fallacy. A king of England is so far from being obliged to observe the opinion of a majority of his council, that he may constitutionally pursue measures directly opposite, if he pleases. Is it not an illiberal insinuation therefore against his majesty that he has adopted the counsel of weak or wicked ministers, in opposition to those of honour and welfare which you suggest that you proposed? do you not in fact throw the same ungenerous reflection on him, that ought to be your master, that you have on his council? Let me now enquire whether your sovereign's dissenting from your opinion, was not the true cause of your resignation? and let it be imagined, that his majesty had agreed with you in opinion, would you then have renounced his service because the council had dissented from you? Would not you have been better pleased with this obedience, inasmuch as it would have afforded a stronger indication of your power, or of your superior judgment? If you answer in the negative, to what purpose were your humble sentiments delivered in writing to your king? Were they given for the sake of publishing to the people, that he as well as the council had refused the advice of honour and the public good? I shall take it for granted,

granted, that you will disavow that intent, and that the nation will believe you would have remained in your post. You will be pleased therefore to satisfy those to whom you have already appealed, in what manner the opposition of the council has produced your resignation, when, had the king approved your measures, you would have remained in office? Hence, Sir, does it not appear, that neither the different opinion of the council, nor the refusal of being permitted to guide the state, were the true motives of your retirement; and though no man may contradict, yet I think that no man can reasonably believe your assertions, and that all must see your unbecoming treatment of the best of princes. The motives thereto I shall endeavour to assign before I finish this letter.

Nor is this the only error which you have committed in the passage relative to your guidance. You say you resigned because you would not be responsible for measures you were no longer allowed to guide. In this declaration you forget yourself, the nature of your office, and the constitution of the realm. You certainly forget yourself when you expect that your king and his subjects are implicitly to obey your dictates. You forget the nature of your office when you

expect that a secretary of state is to be indulged with the sole guidance of the state, because there is another in all respects co-equal with you in office ; and who has the same right to claim the sole guidance. Would not this kingdom be reduced to a blessed state, were two such ministers empowered with the right of solely guiding it, and who may frequently have contradictory views ? if you have no title to the sole guidance, much less have you to that of solely dictating the measures of the kingdom. A secretary of state is the servant of the king and kingdom, and can have no possible pretext for pretending to be lord paramount of all public affairs. You forget the constitution by conceiving that you can be responsible for measures which you disavow ; because by the fourth article of the act of settlement, it is expressly declared, “ that from and after the time that the further limitation by the act shall take effect, all matters and things relative to the well-governing of this kingdom, which are properly cognizable in the privy-council, by the laws and customs of this realm, shall be transacted there ; and all resolutions taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the privy-council as shall advise and consent to the same.”

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In what manner then could you have been answerable for the events of measures which were contrary to your judgment, who undertook the guidance thereof in obedience to the duty of your office ? and when such authentic evidence might be brought of your disavowing them. Under such circumstances to whom could you be responsible ? if you still persist in this cause of your resignation, you incontrovertably declare that either you are unacquainted with this essential article of the English constitution, and expose yourself by a deficiency of knowledge incompatible with the idea of a minister : or you hold the understandings of all men at so cheap a rate, that you believe them ignorant of this fact, and that it would never be brought against you.

It is pleasant to observe the contradiction which appears between the terms of your expressions, and the manner of your conduct ; you tell us “ you submitted in writing your Most Humble sentiments to his majesty,” and yet you refuse to officiate in your department longer than you can govern without controul. Amazing instance of humility ! you desert the service of the best of sovereigns as you declare him to be, and as he certainly is, and the nation’s welfare, as you assert, because he will not tamely resign himself

self and his subjects to your absolute direction, and because the privy-council will not give up their understandings, and the duty which they owe his majesty and the nation to you alone. Is not this expectation a marvellous act of humiliation? Cromwell had the grace to conceal his despotic designs 'till he had cut his sovereign's head off. There have been innumerable instances of men who have dared to dethrone their princes, in favour of themselves, of aristocracy, and of democracy, but till this moment I believe it has been unexampled, that any man has presumed to rule without controul, over king, lords and commons, and assume that plenitude of power, which was never imagined to exist but in God alone.

Surely you will not henceforth inveigh against the doctrine of passive obedience, who expect it from your king as well as from his people. You will not exclaim against Jacobites, and figuratively foolish talk of streets paved therewith. Such men, however mistaken in the object of their favour, are not misled in the nature of their duty; and the most sanguine that ever existed would renounce all inclination to see his present majesty become the subject of the pretender or his son, whatever may be their sentiments respecting the right of reigning.

reigning. They have too much regard for that head which has been once furrounded with the diadem, to behold it thus humbled in the dust by an overbearing subject.

Certainly, Sir, no history can furnish an example of pride and meanness equal to that which inhabits your bosom. The man who will neither permit the king nor council to entertain an opinion different from his own, and participate in the direction of the state; in consequence thereof, appeals to a citizen of London; and such a citizen, in justification of his conduct, submits to its being printed in the public papers; and, may I not say, adds malice to the whole. And at this moment he deserts his master's service, flanders his privy-council, indirectly reflects on him, and attempts to fill the nation with sedition, through apprehension of those measures, which may be now pursued by the best of kings.

But after all, it may be, that the merits of your guidance, and the success which has attended it, may claim this passive obedience from your king and his council, and vindicate your proceedings. Let us examine, therefore, into this particular, and see on what foundation you have expected such unlimited complaisance.

At

At your coming to the supreme direction, for such you acknowledge it to have been, the fleet of England and her land forces were immense. These being already prepared, that provision, at least, can not be ascribed to your care. It must be allowed that Boscawen was sent by your orders to command the fleet, and general Amherst the land forces; but those forces were already in America, prepared for the undertaking, and equal to the effect which they produced. They bravely made a descent and subdued the island of Cape Breton: the merit of this conquest then is conjointly to be ascribed to you and him who immediately preceded you in the seals: for, certainly, whatever may be imputed to his charge, the want of spirit has never been his failing, and his connexions sufficiently evince his zeal for carrying on the war. You will be pleased then to assign some valid reason why the same success might not have followed under his administration as your own; because I shall not be influenced by popular opinion, grounded on popular prejudice.

In consequence of this victory, which the cheapness of the purchase declared the facility of acquiring, for the bravery of the troops having surmounted the difficulties of landing, Louisbourg was found untenable
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and surrendered, the spirits of the people which had hitherto been unusually depressed were now as causelessly exalted to as excessive a degree, and that disposition, together with the idea of your being their minister, carried them into an exultation which the importance and merit of the conquest could in no sense support.

It ought to be remarked also, that you entered on no new plan of operations in that part of the world. You minutely followed that which had been laid down by those against whom you so sarcastically inveighed on that account, and which, from this circumstance, it is evident you either understood not at that time, declaimed against contrary to your own convictions, or were incapable of designing a better. It was then visible to all thinking men, that Braddock's attack on Fort du Quesne had been ill judged; and that even victory had been useless: that the reduction of all the fortresses dependant on Quebec were of as little avail, as cutting down the branches of a tree in order to destroy it, when it might be extirpated by the root: and therefore that the above-mentioned city was the sole object worthy of ministerial attention. Notwithstanding this, as popular applause was the mistress you were wooing, and you

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thought it expedient that she should be kept in good humour even by actions unequal to such desert, and of no significance to the kingdom, Abercromie, a general of your choice, or adoption, was sent with an armament to attack Ticonderago: the event was such as might have been easily foreseen from the abilities of the commander, and the expedition failed in consequence of your insufficiency in deciding of military merit. A deficiency extremely depreciating of the character of a minister.

Notwithstanding this ill success, and the encreasing opinion of the folly of wasting men and money on such inadequate attempts, the same motive of perpetuating the favour of the populace prevailed, and general Forbes was dispatched to attack Fort du Quesne; not without a view of shewing that you could succeed in what other ministers had miscarried. Here again you failed in the choice of your commander; for, by an unwarrantable separation of that force, colonel Grant was cut off with the loss of eight hundred men, a loss that infinitely exceeded the value of the acquisition, which was deserted and left defenceless to the possession of our troops.

Your next attempt was to subdue the island of Martinico. The powers which
were

were destined to this expedition, and the officers who commanded, were of your appointing: the insufficiency of this preparation was perceived the moment the design was attempted to be carried into execution; the general had scarcely landed his troops when the impracticability of success determined him to decline the attack, and to re-embark his forces. Hence, it is manifest, either that you had conceived no idea of the strength of the place, or of the powers which were necessary for subduing it: and, that since the conduct of the commanders hath never been called in question for so precipitately retreating without any attempt to succeed, the sole cause of this miscarriage is to be imputed to you alone. Disappointed in their views on Martinico, from the deficiency of force, the armament set sail for Guadalupe, where it gave evident proofs that want of courage was not the cause of their declining to effect the reduction of the other island. They landed, took the strong places, and drove the inhabitants into the mountains, where, refusing to submit, they awaited succours from Martinico.

Whatever was their motive for capitulating needs not to be enquired into; they certainly might have held out six hours, or even six days longer: and yet, the former

time, according to all human probability, had proved sufficient to have frustrated the whole effect of this armament; for within that short space, a force arrived to their assistance equal to their delivery; but the capitulation was signed, the inhabitants refused to recede from the stipulation they had made, and the conquest was secured.

Now, Sir, I imagine your most sanguine city friend, with all that ebullition of assumption which accompanies his behaviour, will hardly assert you are so admirably gifted with foresight, that you foresaw the Guadalupians would surrender within six hours that their deliverance was at hand: and without this foresight, I see not in what manner the merit of this conquest can be ascribed to you, whose preparations were so evidently unequal to the design; unless the merit of setting it on foot with such imperfect powers, and the boon which chance alone bequeathed you, can constitute a title to that claim of indulgence in despotism, which you demand.

Let me now return to affairs on the American continent, and lay before you your conduct thereof. In this you still trod in the steps of those whom you so egregiously despised. Nor that alone, you committed the most unpardonable error which a minister

ster can commit: for, besides your destining the troops to the reduction of places which must have fallen in consequence of taking the capital, you appointed a force beyond all controversy inadequate to the subduing Quebec, unless that defect had been supplied by conduct and courage almost miraculous; and for the truth of this I refer you to the first account transmitted by the gallant Wolfe.

General Johnson, whose merit deserved a greater command, was sent to attack Niagara, and that brave man succeeded. General Amherst of equal desert marched to the sieges of Ticonderago and Crown-Point, and both these fortresses yielded to his arms. General Wolfe, for ever to be revered and lamented, appeared before Quebec. The season was too far advanced to permit a practicability of general Amherst's marching to the aid of the army before that city, on which account the general, lamenting the inequality of his numbers, to that ardour which inflamed his breast to serve his country, was reduced to a situation that rendered his retreat as perilous as an attempt to conquer. In these circumstances he resolved, at least, to prove himself equal to the purpose to which he was appointed, and to the command of a greater army. With
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this design having surveyed the dispositions of the enemy, and finding that the imagined inaccessibility of a mountain had created an inattention of that part in the French commander, he ordered his men to ascend the steep, though practicable for two only a-breast, and the whole army mounted in that manner. The surprize of this action had half prepared the enemy for defeat, the English attacked and conquered, and the reduction of Quebec was the prize of that day. But, alas! the brave, the immortal Wolfe, whose excellence supplied the absence of those forces which you ought to have sent, and on whom the command devolved, in consequence of his being present in America, was the victim of that day. This gallant man, for whose loss not all your actions can atone, fell in the field of battle; but not till his antagonist had first resigned his life to his superiour prowess; and the honour of his unequalled deeds was ascribed to your administration. Certainly you foresaw not that the city would have been attacked by this arduous path. In the orders you issue, there are no commands to ascend the craggy steeps of mountains and to attack the enemy; those are of a different strain, they contain nothing of that spirit which ought to

to be transmitted from a minister to a general, something finical and fantastic ; “ our troops must spread the warm alarm, and make a vigorous impression,” expressions more adapted to a set of men who are to conquer France by wooing the ladies to their embraces, than to animate soldiers to conquer by the sword.

Quebec being thus miraculously taken, the second account which evinced that the whole merit of the action was due to the general, like a deluge, covered the culpability of your neglect, and you received the applause of that deed which he died to accomplish.

Amherst, compelled by the season, retired to repose his troops in winter quarters among the provinces. General Townshend returned to England, and general Murray, by your consent undoubtedly, was left commander in chief. Montcalm being slain, the command of the French devolved on Mons. Levi: as the spring advanced, the latter led his troops with a view to recover Quebec, and Murray, with a garrison scarce equal to the defence of the town, marched out to give him battle, and was defeated. Such being the issue of this unaccountable proceeding, which nothing seems to have given rise, but his falacious imagination of
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being equal to the skill and magnanimity of general Wolfe; he retreated to the city with the loss of all his cannon, by which the enemy were more enabled to accomplish the intention on which they had taken arms, and to defend that place with his diminished forces, to which his whole number before the battle was unequal.

The city was invested, and the whole of that acquisition, which Wolfe had purchased by his blood, was on the point of being resumed. Whilst things were in this situation, a frigate arrived at Quebec, which brought intelligence that lord Colville was arrived in the river. This frigate, with one more, were sent to attack the French who were above the town. Levi seeing the hardiness of this action, and being informed that Lord Colville was arrived, concluded therefore that it could have proceeded from no other cause than that of the arrival of a reinforcement sufficient to defeat his purpose. Whereupon, without tarrying to be convinced of the truth or falshood of his conception, he raised the siege; and thus the city was preserved by the enemy's fears, which could not have been defended from their arms. In this instance many were the incidents which tended to the preservation of the place, the merit of which cannot be imputed to your
con-

conduct, and in which all that should have proceeded from you, was neglected. You sent not a sufficient force to preserve the conquest which had been made; had lord Colville arrived before Quebec together with the frigate, Levi must have seen that he had brought no additional force that could have prevented his design. Certainly it was not in consequence of your orders that his lordship remained below, and sent up intelligence: had the Frenchman tarried only to be truly informed of the forces which were arrived, he would not have discontinued the siege: surely you never suggested to him the thought which produced his retreat: and yet without that thought the labour of the last campaign had been rendered useless, and probably the conquest of that fortress had never been accomplished. Let then all that is due to you, in the success of this expedition, be placed to your account: and to what will it fairly amount; that you in England set out an armament with powers so unequal to the design, that it was a thousand to one that it did not succeed.

In the following campaign, general Amherst completed the conquest of Canada, the means of which had been afforded him by the almost miraculous victory and pre-

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servation

servation of Quebec. This acquisition therefore is not to be attributed to your glory, by the strongest prejudice, unless you are endowed with the power of commanding fortune, or of working miracles.

Such being the true state of what is to be attributed to your conduct, respecting our successes in America, the most brilliant part of your administration; let me ask you what it contains, which might not have been transacted by the meanest understanding. Would any man of common intellect have disposed of things in a manner so as to have left the chief object the least attended to? have you made a league with fortune that she is to supply the deficiencies of your capacity? how then are you entitled to the glories of those successes, which by your insufficient preparations were so far deprived of all probability of happening? Indeed, Sir, while the populace were resounding your praises for the conquests of Quebec, Guadalupe, &c. and ascribing them to your conduct, it appeared to me that they would have been more reasonably and more gratefully employed in returning thanks to the Almighty, for at once defending them from the arms of their enemies, and the weakness of your administration. Having in this manner placed in
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the fore-ground the most beautiful figures of your ministry, that they may be viewed alone, in their proper light, and unobscured by what may be drawn around them, I proceed to follow your ministerial conduct into other parts where we have carried our arms, and state its true merit.

The taking Senegal and Goree forms one of the events which is ascribed to your glory. This design however was not of your planning, that belongs either to Mr. Postlethwaite, or a Quaker. All the merit that you can claim therein, is that of following their advice; and even in the execution thereof, inconsiderable as the affair was in itself, you were still unequal to it. Insufficiency of force, a circumstance almost inseparable from your expeditions attended this also. Senegal was gladly given up by the French garrison, but the attack on Goree was ineffectual through want of powers, and it remained to be subdued by a new armament and at a fresh expence.

Having in this manner succinctly delineated your conduct relative to America and Africa, permit me to return to the continent of Europe, and examine in what manner it has been displayed in this part of the world. And because in your printed letter, you tell us, “that you have served your

country with Fidelity as well as success." I beg leave to recede to your first appearance in public life, in order that your fidelity may be placed in its true point of view, as well as your success.

Your first exhibitions of oratoric invective were directed against the administration of Sir Robert Walpole, in which you forgot not to treat the family on the throne with much sarcastic expression also; and you pointed out the ruin which his measures must infallibly bring upon this country, with great exuberance of tropes, figures and invectives. In consequence of this patriot appearance you were considered in a very favourable light by all who wished well to their native land; and the dutchess of Marlborough, in consideration of the utility which must result from the principles you professed, if pursued with steadiness and rigor, bequeathed you ten thousand pounds, and settled a very large estate upon you, in case of the failure of male heirs, before the present lord Spencer became of age; and this, unless I am mistaken, on conditions of your accepting no post under the government.

On these terms this legacy was given and received, and the consequence of it was, that when you had changed your conversation

tion relative to Sir Robert, and taken a place under his ministry, the condition on which the legacy was given in the will, was annihilated by parliamentary power; you were thereby enabled to retain the money, and the other advantages of the dutchess's donation, and enjoy your place also.

It is not to be doubted but the parliament has a power of changing the intention of any one's will: but it may be doubted whether a man of honour or fidelity can conscientiously receive ten thousand pounds, and violate the obligation for which it was given. Should you not, either in obedience to the conditions on which you accepted it, have remained unplaced? or, in obedience to your new conversion, have returned the money when you accepted the place? on the contrary, you preserved the rewards of patriotism, and enjoyed the income of a placeman: and your oratoric larum, which had rung so sonorously against Sir Robert, now sounded with no less vehemence in his favour; for it is of most singular construction, and rings in drawing up as well as in running down. This change of conduct threw you into great contempt in the opinion of all who had expected that some advantage might be derived to the nation from your perseverance in pursuing the minister.

minister. You, Sir, affected to contemn their sarcasms, sunk into quiet, and declared you could shew an unembarrassed countenance, and thus remained, enjoying a very great post, and little sollicitous concerning national affairs, or the transactions of parliament.

It is certain this change might possibly have proceeded from conviction that you had been formerly engaged in errors; and had your conduct remained uniform from this time, at least that circumstance would have afforded a very strong argument in justification of your change of opinion: but when it is seen that opinions are adopted and thrown aside in proportion only as they square with present views and private interest, it is impossible that conscience can be concerned in such changes, or fidelity belong to such men.

The present war breaking forth, and the nation being in general dissatisfied with the conduct of those who were then in the ministry, you thought it once more a favourable hour to resume your former patriotism; and accordingly you inveighed with all possible acrimony against ministers and their administration. You pronounced that the pursuit of German measures, the hiring German mercenaries, making alliances with Ger-

German princes, and wasting English treasure on such accounts, must inevitably undo this country ; and lastly, that Hanover was the millstone which would drown this kingdom.

Surprising as it may seem, notwithstanding your former revolt from the same professions, the populace, like a bankrupt, who wishes to free himself of his present troubles, by placing his affairs in the hands of assignees, and believes every idle proposition, again gave credit to what you said. You became their great favourite, and, in fact by the ill appearance of things, and by the apprehension of the multitude, which was hunted into the dread of events the most improbable ; you were at length forced upon his late majesty. You received the seals on the 4th of December 1756, and the people now believed that all evils were remedied, because you were at the head of the administration. A belief founded on your repeated declarations of those mischiefs which our connections with Germany had induced, and on conviction that you would be steadfast in preserving the kingdom from such evils for the future.

The French armies were now marching towards the electoral dominions, and his royal highness the duke of Cumberland was pre-

preparing to put himself at the head of the Hanoverians, and mercenary troops in the pay of this kingdom; and such was your apparent steadiness to the sentiments you had professed, that when he requested a single regiment of the guards alone, you declared that you would never consent that one single guard should pass the channel. For this declaration and others similar thereto, as it was then supposed, the seals were taken from you on the 5th of April; and the truth of your patriotism obtained so general a belief on this event amongst the multitude, that the city of London presented you with the freedom thereof in a gold box, an example then followed by many other corporations in the kingdom. His royal highness the duke passed into Germany, and the post which you had occupied remained unfilled. During this time it is evident from the effects which followed, that you entered into a coalition with those very ministers whom you had condemned as the most weak and wicked. Lord Anson, into whose conduct it had been proposed to enquire in the house of commons, you excused, by saying, his mismanagement arose not from criminality, but want of capacity; and then when you resumed the seals on the 29th of June, the above nobleman

man was reinstated at the head of the admiralty ; though, according to your account, he was rendered unfit for it, by the most incurable of all causes, want of intellect. The others against whom you had exclaimed as men destructive to their country, were provided with great places ; and you had no objection to see those whom you had so frequently represented as knaves and fools at the heads of the most important departments of the state, provided you were their ruler. ---Is this fidelity to your country ?

But we shall soon see that to govern such men was not the sole condition of your accepting the seals. The patriotic spirit of opposing German measures gave way also to that lust of despotism which rages so unbounded in your bosom. And rather than not be minister, you resolved to sacrifice what you had named the preservation of England, to those measures against which you had so sarcastically inveighed as its destruction.

The terms on which you had accepted the seals, being unknown to the multitude, they remained convinced that England was now blessed with a minister, which no temptation could induce to swerve from the true interest of the realm, or to unite in the support of continental measures. We shall soon see on what foundation this opinion of

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your steadfastness was placed; how consentaneous your future conduct has been to the previous professions which gained you this confidence, and of what utility this popular belief of anti-germanic principles soon proved on an occasion that immediately followed.

At the time of your resuming the seals, the duke of Cumberland was retreating from before the French, and had passed the Weser. The first of your undertaking was a secret expedition against Rochfort; and the chief cause of this armament was, as you express it in the second head of your orders to Sir John Mordaunt, "to cause some diversion, and engage the enemy to employ, in their own defence, a considerable part of their forces, destined to invade and oppress the liberties of the empire, and to subvert the independency of Europe." At this moment, it is manifest, from your future conduct, that you had resolved that the arms of England should henceforth be subservient to German measures, and that those principles on which you had founded your popular fame should never influence your actions.

The expedition against Rochfort was almost ready for its departure, when, on the 25th of July, the battle of Hastenbeck was fought between the French and the duke
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of Cumberland ; and the latter was so far foiled, that he resolved to retreat to cover Bremen and Verden, to keep open a communication with Stade, and preserve the archives and treasure of Hanover, which were moved that way, from falling into the hands of the enemy.

As his royal highness foresaw that the procuring of provision for the sustenance of his army, would not be the least of those difficulties to which he must be reduced, he expressed himself to the ministry of England on that head; and you promised to supply him, by way of Stade, from England, with what his army might stand in need of.

There was at this time a great dearth of corn in England, the poor were starving with famine, and a law had been made excluding the crown, as well as the subject, from exporting grain of all kinds. Pity for your famished countrymen, and the sacredness of the laws were of little avail in your bosom. You bounced through these obligations like a wild boar through the toils, and ordered corn to be bought and shipped for Stade : but the officers of the customs refusing to grant permission to an illegal export, and a friend of your's learned in the law, advising you to desist therefrom, because of its illegality ; that very

corn, which had been purchased to supply the German army, the exportation of which must have encreased this peoples miseries, was relanded; and it was industriously inserted in the papers, that you were the cause of preventing that grain from being carried abroad, in order that the people might feel no greater distress than that which had happened from the inclemency of seasons. In this manner your intended violation of humanity, and the legislature was converted to your applause; because the people were not yet acquainted with your change of sentiments.--- Was this fidelity to your country?

It being now impracticable to supply the army with provisions, and it being resolved not to risque a second action, another measure was entered upon for the preservation of the treasure, &c. of Hanover. A treaty of neutrality was begun between his royal highness and the duke de Richlieu, under the mediation of the king of Denmark. By this event you were reduced to no small perplexity. The transports for the expedition, either by contrary winds, or for particular reasons, arising from circumstances in Germany, had not yet arrived at Portsmouth, at which place they were destined to take the troops on board. The great difficulty
which

which now attended you, consisted in directing measures in a manner, so that the convention might not be frustrated by the military operations of this armament; nor the expedition seem to be rendered abortive by that treaty; and yet, you to preserve the appearance of your former patriotism, and cover thereby the conduct of the whole from the reprehension of the vulgar eye. Let me now examine, whether, from the particulars which have been published by authority, there are not just grounds to infer, that the attempt on Rochfort was declined in consequence of an inclination that it should not be attacked.

It can hardly be believed at this time, that the terms of the convention which was signed on the 6th of September, were neither known nor agreed to in England on the 5th. Had the fleet, therefore, been delayed from sailing till the nation was acquainted with this treaty, of which it was then ignorant, and returned without attempting any thing, it had been too glaring an act to have admitted of any palliative. On the 5th therefore, the most pressing orders were sent for its setting sail: and accordingly, by a letter dated the 10th of the same month, you received an account of its
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being under sail for the place of its destination.

By these means, as the convention, tho' signed, could not have been positively known so to have been at this court, you hoped to evade the imputation of this expedition being affected thereby. But it appears to me that evident proofs may be brought that the event of this armament was influenced by the terms of the treaty, though not expressed in the articles thereof, for reasons too obvious to be mentioned.

The first motive to my believing it consists in the continuation of the same orders which had been issued on the 5th of August, by which the fleet was to return about the end of September. Is it natural to believe that had this expedition been designed to act offensively against Rochfort, that the same orders would have still remained for returning at the end of September, a space too small for the accomplishing such a design, as appears by the subsequent events? Indeed, you at length foresaw that this continuation of the same orders might be considered in the above light, and on the 15th of September the Viper sloop was dispatched after the fleet with fresh orders, and which arrived amongst them on the day they got within the Basque road, on the

22d. By these the commanders were ordered, "that notwithstanding the former orders which had stated the latter end of September for their return, they should not consider the above-mentioned time as intended in any manner to affect or interfere with the full execution of the first and principal object of the expedition; namely, a descent on the French coast, near Rochfort, &c. and that they should not desist from any attempt in which they were actually engaged, on account of the time limited." Here then orders were given for tarrying any time which the commanders might think requisite. Let us now see if their conduct was consentaneous to such orders, and if there be not sufficient cause therefrom to infer, that their behaviour must have arisen from something of a different kind.

Sir Edward Hawke, in his letter to you, says, "that before he received his majesty's orders by the Viper sloop, he had made the disposition for attacking the Isle of Aix," (a step in the general opinion necessary for securing the landing of the troops) and yet Sir John Mordaunt, in his letter to you, says, "he is pleased with thinking, that, before the receipt of your letter by the Viper, he had judged right in resolving to attack

attack l'Isle de Aix; though it could not possibly be done without breaking in some measure into his majesty's orders, in regard to their time of returning to England." Does not this convey the idea that Sir John had imagined, that the expedition was to have consisted of sailing out and home without attempting to effect any thing; since he values himself on judging right to attack a place that was thought necessary to expedite their descent against Rochfort? and does not this expression of judging right seem to be an answer to an order sent by the Viper for attacking some smaller place, which might impart the idea of the fleet being in earnest in this expedition? it is certainly no answer to the orders which were published. It would be agreeable to know why landing was deemed impracticable by a council of war, when mess. Broderick, Douglas, Dennis, and Buckle, had, on an examination of the coast, declared, that a landing was practicable. As to the dangers that might happen from the swell of the sea, as there was none at that time, it was probable that none would happen, and consequently a fear of possible events was an inadequate cause for declining the descent. The accounts from French ships and French prisoners relative to Rochfort, were certainly in-

insufficient on which to form an opinion, relative to the declining a descent; and the general had objected to accounts, in favour of it, obtained from other prisoners. As to the danger of the troops being overpowered by superior numbers, there could never be less foundation for such belief than on this occasion, because no such troops appeared, and though an escalade might not have taken place against Rochfort, yet a landing being made, red-hot bullets and bombs, might with great facility have been thrown amongst the naval stores, ships, and magazines, so as to have destroyed all these, and rendered the expedition of great consequence. As to the difficulty of taking fort Fouras, in order to secure a landing place, that was no objection, because it impeded not the landing. All these objections being insufficient, is it not probable, that some secret reason was the cause of not attempting a descent?

However, notwithstanding, a descent had been deemed impracticable, on the 25th of September, a council of war was held again on the 28th, and it was then unanimously agreed by the council, that it was adviseable to land the forces to attack the two forts on the mouth of the river Charrante. The council being broke up, Broderick writes Sir Edward Hawke a letter, G signifying,

signifying, that having prepared the boats with proper officers, &c. the generals had come to a resolution not to land the forces that night, and to wait till day-light. Upon this Sir Edward Hawke writes to Sir John Mordaunt, to know whether the general officers had any farther military operations to propose, that he might not unnecessarily detain the Squadron there; and Sir John Mordaunt returns for answer, that talking with the land-officers, they had all agreed in returning to England.

Now, Sir, it will be difficult to decide, why a descent, agreed on by the land and sea officers, and prepared to be made, should be set aside by those of the land alone. Why, Sir Edward Hawke, at the moment when the descent was resolved on, and no time of return, respecting that affair, limited, by the second orders, should, without a council of war, resolve on returning to England with the fleet; and, lastly, why the land generals, who had concluded on a descent the day before, should now determine on returning to England without attempting it? do not all these circumstances put together, induce a strong probability, that the Viper sloop carried out more papers than have been given to the public, and that these contradictory councils and resolutions were

were contrived to give to this armament, the parade and countenance of a descent that was never intended to be made,

In this manner ended the expedition against Rochfort, with destroying a small fort at l'Isle de Aix, and bringing back a casket of grapes---A glorious acquisition for so immense an expence !

Amazing as this event appeared in the eyes of all men, the cause of it had probably remained unenquired into, had it not been moved in the common-council of the city of London, that a petition should be made to his majesty for an examination into the causes of the ill success. And as this enquiry might probably have been parliamentary, it was thought proper to prevent such application, lest things might thereby come to light, which you wished for ever to conceal in darkness. And this was effected by a message from the king to the lord-mayor, signifying, that he had ordered the affair to be enquired into. In consequence of this, Sir John Mordaunt was brought to tryal : but not in the common manner. It was first referred to three general officers to enquire, whether this miscarriage ought to be enquired into or not ; by the institution of which it is evident, that all examination was to be evaded, if possible. But as it ap-

peared to them, that the reasons for declining the descent were insufficient, it followed that some enquiry was to be made into the cause thereof.

And here it ought to be remarked, that from the nature of the first orders which were given, it seems as if it was foreseen, that an event like that which happened, was to be the consequence of this expedition. And therefore contrary to the usual custom, the chief in command was rescinded from following the best judgment he could form on his own lights, and those which he might receive from others, and implicitly to obey the opinion of a majority of a council of war, the members of which were named in his orders.

Hence it was impossible the general who followed the conclusions of such a council could with the least degree of common sense be called to answer for his conduct. It was manifest that all who advised the measures were the proper objects of public enquiry; and that in this instance it was the whole council. Notwithstanding which, Sir John Mordaunt alone was the person into whose conduct any examination was made; and those who ought equally with himself to have come under a like scrutiny were admitted to be his witnesses. The effect

fect of this was evident: the general in chief was acquitted: it was, indeed, impossible he could be found guilty. In this manner ended that enquiry, which, from the very manner of its being conducted, it is self evident was to conclude as it did.

After having in this manner put together the circumstances of the convention and conduct of the expedition, if any one remains unconvinced of your management therein, he must necessarily agree, that this undertaking was adopted on grounds which could warrant no such proceeding, or that the inseparable attendant of all your armaments, insufficiency of force, defeated the whole design. To those who believe the former, how will you vindicate your fidelity? to those who believe the latter, how will you support the reputation of a minister?

Notwithstanding this event, and though the populace, who had received a deep impression of your patriotism from your zeal against German measures, still continued to believe you steady to your former sentiments, you thought it necessary to give out something which might obviate the belief that was getting ground amongst the more sharp-sighted, that the convention had defeated the expedition. With this design it was
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carefully and fallaciously insinuated, that his royal highness had prevailed on some of the officers to render the attempt abortive; because of his dislike to you. And it was inserted in the foreign Gazettes under a name of authority, that the convention was concluded without the knowledge of the court of England. Improbable as this must be, it was swallowed by the multitude: and injurious as it was to his royal highness, who, according to this account, had made a treaty to render an army in the pay of England impotent, without authority, it remained uncontradicted. You knew that the son would not openly contradict this assertion, and publicly declare what must be disagreeable to the father; that his proximity to the throne would prevent all parliamentary enquiry; and that on these accounts you should be safe from public contradiction. In this manner you attempted to free yourself from the imputation of having deserted your principles, and threw an aggravated odium on the duke, who had declined in popular favour, because of his attachment to your predecessor in office, and chief object of your aversion,

As the expedition to Rochfort had been undertaken for the sake of German measures, it is the less to be admired if its defeat

feat was owing to the same cause. And indeed, there existed at that time a motive which might have operated in your bosom with great prevalence in favour of the convention against the expedition. It may not be unlikely that this treaty of neutrality which was to continue during the war, did at that time prove a temptation more strong than the glory of a successful expedition: since thereby you might have flattered yourself with being enabled to preserve the appearance of adhering to your anti-germanic principles, and abstain from sending men and money where none could reasonably be required. If this was not the motive, why did you decline the most favourable opportunity of renouncing all connection with that German state, which, according to your account, had violated every thing that ought to be held sacred amongst princes, and bound fast the hands of an army in England's pay, without her consent. Here was a subject for an orator who loves his country. This, indeed, had been a glorious act, and must have rendered you immoveable by kings, the darling of the nation, and immortal in renown.

But, alas! in avoiding, by a convention, the mischief which was dreaded from the French, a danger not less imminent, was
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incurred from another quarter. The King of Prussia did something more than complain of this treaty. It was now thought expedient to calm his resentment, and, as the neglect of the French troops by marshal Richlieu, had diminished their number and impaired their strength, that circumstance afforded a probability of infracting the late treaty, at least, with present impunity, and on this presumption that measure was resolved on: and the treatment which the French gave the Hanoverians was aggravated into the most inhuman of all actions, in order thereby to give countenance to this new design.

If your former principles, or the welfare England had possessed any influence over your mind, you had certainly opposed this breach of the convention; but you had renounced them both, and entered heartily into the intent of re-commencing hostilities between the armies on the continent; and from the summit of that pile of pretended patriotism, which you had erected on the coast of Albion, you now sowed headlong into the Germanic Ocean, resolved to perish or to cross it. The building vanished instantaneously, and left not a wreck behind.

Notwithstanding this resolution, it had been impossible for you to have done this
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without the loss of all popular reputation, had not the very contrary of what you had been labouring to create, prevailed at this time, the aversion of the English for the French, supplanted all that hatred which you had endeavoured to excite against the Germans and even your former predictions of ruin were forgotten in this universal detestation of our enemies. It was now, Sir, you bound the millstone around the neck of England with stronger chains and encreased its weight ; you augmented the number of those mercenaries, and renewed those treaties and alliances which you had so often pronounced would undo this land. In short, you kept no measure in your proceeding ; but with giant strides stepped on in the very path of those whom you had so egregiously condemned. You approved the conduct of ministers whom you had dispossessed of their offices, as weak and wicked : avowed that England could be preserved alone by the pursuit of continental interests. Again you became the convert of your former contempt, publicly recanted your late principles, and were lavish in the praise of those whom you now once more insinuate are not fit to be trusted with the honour of the crown and interest of the nation. Was there ever equal criminality or equal baseness ? The former,

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if conscious of their having done amiss, you applauded their measures. The latter, if you slander them for opposing your arbitrary dictates. And lastly, when the king of Prussia, afraid of a second convention, insisted on appointing the general of the army in English pay, you observed no regard to that fundamental law, the Act of Settlement, which declares, " That no person born out of these kingdoms shall be capable to enjoy any office, either civil or military ;" but consented that prince Ferdinand should become the generalissimo of our armies, and thereby broke through the constitution, to the disgrace of the realm, in favour of a foreigner, who cannot be made answerable by our laws for whatever misconduct he may commit.--- Is this fidelity to your country ?

The French were obliged to relinquish their conquest, and to retire beyond the Rhine, and prince Ferdinand followed them with the troops under his command. This being an action pleasing to the populace, and probably commanded for that reason, you who had so frequently declared, that not a soldier should cross the seas to fight in German lands, renounced that declaration, and now first sent the troops of England to join the arms of the mercenary forces of this kingdom. The folly of thus pursuing the
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enemy was soon made manifest. The new commander, even after what was called a victory, was unable to remain on the other side of the Rhine, escaped with great difficulty, and retreated towards the electoral dominions, followed by the French. It would be endless to enumerate the various events which happened on the continent between the two armies, till marshal Contades had returned to the confines of Hanover, Munster and Paderborn were retaken by the French, and the two armies lay divided by a small river. At this time the general of France, in a masterly manner, crossed this stream, and in the night drew up his army undiscovered by prince Ferdinand. Never was an army more compleatly surpris'd; never was there a greater instance of inattention in a general than in the German: no history can produce an example where less has been done by the chief in command, to recover the disorders occasioned by this surprize, and no legendary account of knight errantry can afford an instance of a victory more miraculously obtained than that which was that day won. Five or six thousand English, uncommanded to the action by the general in chief, unsupported by him when it was begun, spread such terror through seventy thousand Frenchmen, by the unex-

amplified manner with which they advanced, that the whole army retired before them, and the conquering general knew not that he had conquered. Certainly, Sir, this success is not to be ascribed to you, nor to your skill in adopting a commander.

The surprize in which he had been caught, the embarrassmēt of his conduct on the day of battle, and other circumstances, previous to this action, had filled his mind with strong conviction that those particulars had not escaped the notice of the nobleman who commanded the English forces under him: to obviate, therefore, what might arise from his representations, this general in chief, in the most insidious manner, imputed the incompleteness of the victory to the fault of the English commander: and you seconded him in propagating that imputation. So many errors in generalship had never been manifested in one day by any man as by this foreigner; and though victory declared for England, there never existed more reasons to dismiss any general from any service than on this occasion. You, Sir, embraced a different opinion, procured him a blue ribband, and a present of twenty thousand pounds. And as you knew the honour of that nobleman, who had been thus indignantly treated, would

would certainly lead him to exert those powers of manly eloquence with which he is endowed, and to discover a thousand things which you wished to have concealed; you urged every means by which his character might be damned in the public opinion, and his words unlistened to in the house of commons. In this you succeeded. It is worth while to remark also the different manners in which the trials of lord George and Sir John Mordaunt were conducted: how eagerly the condemnation of the former was pressed, and how indulgently the latter was treated.

I shall say nothing of the thousands of our brave contrymen who have perished through want since that time; of your arts in disguising the losses and augmenting the successes which our troops have had; of the wantonness in shedding the blood of Englishmen in Quixotic vagaries by the hereditary prince; of the preservation of the lives of mercenaries in preference to those of the natives of this land; or of the ineffectual squandering of so many millions to keep the French from the electoral territories, and which by its delay has only improved the miseries of England, and verified that truth from which you have twice revolted.---Are these the marks of fidelity to your country?

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Having done with your ministry respecting German affairs, I return to your conduct relative to those descents which were made on the coast of France. Your second undertaking was an intended attack on St. Maloes; and to this expedition sixteen battalions and nine troops of light horse were destined under the command of the duke of Marlborough. No sooner was the descent accomplished than that fault which seems incurable in you, again manifested itself, insufficiency of force. It was found impracticable to attack the place with the least probability of success: and the sole effect of this expence and preparation consisted in burning about a hundred small ships and some stores, after which the troops re-embarked for England.

Notwithstanding this event, so inadequate to what you had proposed, and to the expence thereof, you resolved on another invasion of the coast of France; and, as if your whole knowledge of that shore consisted in that of St. Maloes, you prepared a second armament; and because the preceding force had been unequal to the design you repeated the same attempt with half the number. The whole army now consisting of not more than six thousand: and to render the whole uniformly complete, you chose

chose an officer from the horse to command this expedition. The descent being made, the Open Town of Cherbourg surrendered to our arms, and the mole, the completion of which had been long abandoned by the French, as a work that when finished would be useless, was blown up; and the cannon and mortars which were found in this unfortified place were embarked as trophies of a bloodless victory. The troops being again replaced on board, a second descent was made near St Maloes, and on that side of the river which, if the force had been equal to the design, would alone have rendered the siege impracticable. In this place there was added to your former insufficiency the ridicule of repeating an impracticable thing with less powers, and the choice of a commander unequal to the intent.

St. Maloes being safe from their arms, and it being difficult to re-embark the troops at that place, the ships sailed to the bay of St. Cas, and the land forces marched to meet them at that spot. But such was the infatuation of the general, instead of hastening to put his troops on board, he marched into the country, as if in search of an enemy, and then fled at its first approach. In consequence of this conduct
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he was overtaken on the sea-shore; and our brave troops, to a greater number than you suffered to be inserted in the Gazette, perished by the hands of the enemy, or in the waters of the ocean. Such was the issue of this expedition, which certainly concluded dishonourable to your conduct. Yet, such was your dependance on popular applause, as if the whole affair had terminated in victory, the few cannon and mortars of Cherbourg were dragged from Kensington to the tower, with all the parade of streamers, guards, drums, trumpets and other music, the very mockery of triumph; and many who beheld this burlesque of victory thought that you might with equal reason have conducted the basket of grapes which was brought from l'Isle d'Aix, attended with similar pageantry and pomp, from the palace to the arsenal.

Your next design was on Belleisle, and here again the same deficiency of preparation attended you. The first embarkation was unequal to the purpose, fresh troops were continually sending, till at length the place was taken. If this island was at any time a proper object of your acquisition, the hour was certainly now elapsed; and experience shews us, that the same fleet is

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now necessary to prevent its falling into the hands of its old master, which was before required for the service of the Bay of Biscay. And the sole advantages are no more than so many men taken from other services; and maintained in that place at treble the expence which they would cost in England. Unless indeed the circumstance of setting up a pilchard fishery be added to your glory, and teaching the French the method of catching and curing that fish in the Cornish manner, with which they have been hitherto unacquainted, and thereby enabling them, in time of peace, to interfere, and probably deprive the county of Cornwall of annually receiving more than sixty thousand pounds in return for such merchandize.

Nor is that success, which has been attributed to your administration, to be ascribed only to the superior bravery of our troops and officers, and to incidents which no human foresight could conceive. It looks as if folly had been chosen the directress of the French affairs, in order to obviate all those mischiefs which might otherwise have attended your unequal ministry; and certainly, by the orders of that lady, which were given to the admirals de la Clue and Conflans, by which they were permitted to avoid fighting; the means of victory were

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afforded to the fleets of England, which might otherwise have been purchased with less loss to the enemy, and perhaps with less glory to our arms, had the Frenchmen been obliged to combat as they ought. Certain it is, respecting the design of Conflans, that nothing could be more imprudently conducted. A descent was intended from that kingdom, on some of his majesty's dominions; a fleet was prepared at Brest to convoy the forces; the success of this design necessarily depended on setting sail from the French coast, when the English fleet should be driven therefrom: in order that the same wind which led them to their views, should prevent the English from obstructing them, and all things ought to have been prepared consentaneous to that particular. On the contrary, the forces of France, which should have marched by land; and the transports to receive them, which should have sailed from Vannes to Brest, that the same wind which kept our fleet at a distance, might waft them to the coasts of those realms, were detained in the bottom of the Bay of Biscay, in order to make the embarkation in that place. By this means, when admiral Hawke was blown from that part, and the French embarkation should have sailed; the fleet of France was unable to leave Brest,
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and to repair to the place of rendezvous, where the troops were to be taken on board. And from this it happened that the moment the wind was favourable for that intent, admiral Hawke was, by the same gale, again enabled to return to his former station, and intercept that design. In this manner, though no man could behave with greater bravery, the defeat of the French was as much owing to the blunders of their ministers, as to any other cause; and that armament, which must have escaped from Brest without opposition, was rendered ineffectual, by being obliged to go into the Bay to receive the troops; and thus that victory was compleated, which was not a little owing to their orders for avoiding an engagement also. Thus, Sir, with fortune for your friend, and folly for your foe, it is no wonder that the success of our arms has been so great, notwithstanding your preparations have been so insufficient. But for what reasons their favours are to be ascribed to you alone, I know not: unless it be that the weakness of your administration stood in the utmost need of such assistance; and they were resolved to shew what such powers can effect, without the intervention of human wisdom.

As to the successes which have attended the heaven-born general, and other commanders in the East-Indies, as they were obtained in favour of a trade, which all disinterested men are convinced is detrimental to the kingdom.--- Pray take the whole merit to yourself.

Such having been the true state of what we are indebted to your conduct, for the successes we have had; whatever the condition of the kingdom might have been at your receiving the seals, which is so extravagantly caricatured in the answer of your friend, and the situation of it at your resigning, it is evident beyond contradiction, that these alterations have been less owing to you, than any change for the better, has ever been owing to a minister. And it is evident, that though the nation was reduced to despondency at your coming to the ministry, it still contained powers to extricate itself from such ill grounded apprehensions, and that those were imperfectly applied by you. And we shall shew, that at the time of your resigning, however exulting this nation might be in its imagination, it was in a worse condition than when you came to the administration.

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However, let it be first enquired into, with what propriety it has been said, that the nation has been so much advantaged in the increase of commerce by your ministry. And in this place it might be proved that the greatest fallacy attends this apparent increase of trade; that the largest part of the goods now exported will scarce return the price of the materials unmanufactured; that the new acquisitions are sated with commodities; that the immense loans have taken all the monied men from trade to deal in the stocks; and that scarce any remain in merchandize, but such who by means of paper can procure credit and protract the time of payment by transferring bills from city to city through all Europe; and lastly, that the immense bankruptcies, in consequence of such transactions, unknown to preceding terms, declare the contrary of such advantages.

All these objections, however, to the truth of our improving commerce, I shall wave, and allow you that trade is, if you please, ten times greater and more gainful than ever it has been. But if it can be proved that the money that hereby comes into England passes, by another part of your conduct, through the kingdom, like an eel through the body of a cormorant, without
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leaving any thing behind, will it not appear that as the bird cannot be made fatter by such food, so the nation is not the richer for such wealth? and I fancy, if this profit from trade has been insufficient to supply the money which you have squandered, and millions have gone along with it, that such a circumstance will add no great merit to your ministry.

That this is the case I appeal to the sense of all England. Have not the subsidies which have been granted, and the armies which have been maintained in Germany, devoured many millions more than have been acquired by trade? Otherwise, how comes it to pass that there is so much less bullion in England at present than at the declaration of war; that the price of it is so encreased as to preclude all power of coinage but at a vast loss; that bank bills of ten pounds value have been coined, and that Exchequer notes bear a premium.

Such being the truth of this affair, tell me in what manner the nation is obliged to you for an increase of trade, who have converted the whole advantage thereof to the exhausting of this land and the enriching foreigners. Was not Sir James Key and Touchstone, your brother Orator, therefore, wisely employed in thanking you for carrying our
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arms and commerce to a height unknown before? and in this place it is impossible to avoid remarking, that the same common-council which, in the year 1757, presented you with freedom and gold, because you declared that neither men nor money should be wasted in continental measures, now thank you for an administration that bound the whole nation to trade and labour in order to find supplies for the support of those very German connections which were then exploded. It is not easy to decide whether the common-council in giving such contradictory approbation, or you in receiving it, have manifested the greater weakness and absurdity. But it is to be lamented that the government of the largest city in Europe is entrusted to men who either cannot discern truth from falsehood, or who sacrifice the former to the latter, at the instigation of a man that has derived his notions of treating mankind from the maxims of negro-drivers in the colonies.

Nor is this the sole absurdity to which your city friend has pushed the corporation of London. He has urged them to assert a right of instructing their representatives, which can belong to the constituents only: unless he can shew some instrument by which the common-council is intrusted with
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that charge. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the livery will remember this infringement of their rights, when any man who has presumed to commit it shall set himself up for lord-mayor, and shew him that they are enemies to usurpation.

Nor is this assumption of illegal right more ridiculous than the subjects which are contained in the instructions, two of which only shall be mentioned in this place, reserving the rest till the articles of that peace which you were negociating comes to be considered.

The first article I mean is that which instructs the representatives of London to concur and promote all necessary measures for establishing good œconomy in the distribution of the national treasure; and that they endeavour to have a committee appointed to enquire into any abuses which may have arisen in the application of it, and to prevent any frauds or illicit practices in the management thereof.

Is it possible, Sir, to have penned a more just or more caustic satire on your administration? Has the time existed when the above-mentioned enormities have prevailed with more lawless sway than under your ministry? Did ever a minister before yourself place a general at the head of an army
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who could not be accountable for his extravagance. Certainly your city friend forgot himself in this particular. I would ask you also where was the loyalty which the corporation professes, when, on this occasion, they omitted paying the most just and best deserved compliment to his majesty, who has so eminently set the laudable example of œconomy in the management of his own household? But that expression of loyalty to their sovereign is a direct contradiction to their actions, and unnaturally inserted since at the very time of pronouncing it they are lamenting the loss of a minister who will no longer remain in the administration than he absolutely rules both king and kingdom. This I suppose the laws may not construe into sedition, though it would be difficult to give it a milder name with propriety. Particularly as this great bell-wether of a corporation, by first leaping over the bounds of decency, has taught the silly ones of the lesser cities and towns, to follow their example. And even at this very moment that no contradiction may be wanting in the conduct of the common-council of London, they were preparing to entertain that very prince with all possible splendour and exterior marks of loyalty whom they tacitly condemned for not listening to your

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peremptory dictates, and resigning his right of reigning into your hands. If they are capable of conceiving the least sense of his majesty's gracious condescension and behaviour on that day, they will publicly recant their thanks to you, and shew, that if they had not at first the faculty of discerning their mistaken measures, they have the grace of repenting when they are discovered to be so.

Nor is this dooming of your countrymen to work for alien nations, and exhausting your country of its treasure, the sole effect of your conduct. You have encreased the national debt by fifty millions, and oppressed trade with the weight of paying the interest thereof. Is it not amazing, therefore, when the kingdom is manifestly impoverished in specie, and encreased in mortgages, that your city friend and the common-council should in their instructions declare, that the great increase of commerce is a most convincing proof of the nation's ability, still to carry on and vigorously prosecute the present just and necessary war. But it is easily discerned that this encouragement is given, that national bankruptcy, when it comes, may throw the blame of your extravagance on those who may then be in the administration; and as to the common-council

council, a set of idle drones, who, from behind their counters sell the labours of other mens hands, they care little what taxes are imposed on the industrious people, since they only add the tax to the commodity, and another profit, because that impost requires more money in their business. These men certainly recommend the granting unlimited supplies with strict propriety. I wish they would print a list of all which they have subscribed during the war, that it might be seen how well their actions correspond with their recommendations.

In this manner having fairly enquired into the merits of your conduct in war, and in the improvement of trade, permit me to examine a little into the terms on which you would have concluded hostilities: and whether your talents are better adapted for negotiating peace than for the former transactions. The first thing I shall remark is that your city friend declares in his answer to you, that the French were reduced to sue for peace; when it is manifest, from the Historical Memorial, that overtures were first made on that head from you, and the court of Berlin. The next thing worth remarking is, that when you had agreed to treat, you who were the great and mighty conqueror permitted the vanquished French-

man to propose the terms of accomodation, a circumstance which could proceed from no other motive than from your ignorance in the value of what our arms had acquired, or an inability of proportioning the returns which were to be made on both sides.

The next thing to be observed is, that when France proposed to conclude hostilities on terms that each potentate should retain what he had conquered, that you refused them on German considerations: and when exchanges were agreed to be made, and France proposed to restore the countries of Hesse, and of the duke of Brunswick in consideration of receiving the islands of Guadalupe and Marigalante, that you acquiesced in this proposition: by these means it is undeniable that all the inconveniencies of having electoral territories on the continent, so intimately connected with this crown, are enormously encreased by your ministry. England has not only paid the troops of those states for fighting in their own defence, and granted them money to make amends for what they have suffered by the calamities of war; but it was now to give up the conquest of our arms to purchase their territories from the French, though no treaty has been stipulated which can warrant such proceedings. Certainly, Sir,
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this is no great instance of fidelity to your country: though it be an undeniable evidence of those mischiefs which arise from following those measures, the condemnation of which gave you your first popularity.

Let me now examine more minutely into the knowledge which you possess of the value of those acquisitions which we have made. In all negociations of peace it is the duty of every minister to preserve all possible possessions which may improve the welfare of his own country, and oppose that of his enemy. Let us remark how faithfully you have observed these obligations.

By the conquest of Senegal the negro trade became entirely in our hands, the sole means of supplying the French islands therewith remained to this kingdom alone; and the advantages which must have arisen therefrom in peace and war are conspicuous. In the former the profits had been immense. In the latter we could have embarrassed their plantations by refusing them the means of cultivating their lands. This advantage you renounced by proposing to allow the French some other place of trading on the coast of Guinea; and to this probably you were induced by your friend the Sugarman, who in the midst of all his patriot ebullition which, like small beer from a bottle just uncorked,

uncorked, hissing, frisking and ending in a vapid liquor, would be sorry that the advantage of England should encrease the value of negroes but one per cent. Certainly, Sir, you were mistaken in the estimation of what had been acquired by the above conquest, or postponed the national interest to that of your frothy friend.

Guadalupe and Marigalante are islands which, from the nature of the clime and productions thereof, can never interfere with the commerce of England, and must for ever enrich the realm to which they belong, because the surplus of money that remains beyond the demands of those necessaries which the planters want, must always rest in and enrich the mother country : these islands you consented to give up. Was this owing to the insinuations of your city friend also, who foresaw that the preservation of them must lessen the value of Jamaica sugars, &c. or to your being unacquainted with the true valuation of this conquest. The Newfoundland fishery has been at all times considered not only as the source of great riches, but as the nursery of those seamen who are to man the royal navy ; and the precluding the French, not only as depriving them of much gain, but of all means of manning their fleets and continuing to be a maritime power.

power. The entire preservation of this is undoubtedly the most immediate and indispensable duty of an English minister. This also you gave up. You not only consented to their right of fishing, granted by the treaty of Utrecht, but you added thereto the island of St. Pierre, which belongs to this kingdom. By these concessions the taking of Louisbourg and Cape-Breton were rendered of no consequence. The island of St. Pierre is much better adapted for the purposes of fishing. It affords an harbour for shipping; and all conveniencies for curing the cod. It lies so near the banks that a few hours can at all times carry the boats to or from the spot of fishing; whereas the distance of Cape-Breton is such, that by contrary winds the vessels may be retarded in going or coming more days than it can ever require hours from and to St. Pierre.

In this place it is impossible to avoid remarking that in the instructions which are given to the members of London, it is enjoined, that they take care that the sole and exclusive right of our acquisitions in North-America and the fisheries be preserved to us. Was your city friend unacquainted that you had given up this right; or did he intend to satyrize you for this concession? Certainly, there never was an
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equal instance of preposterous behaviour as that of lamenting your resignation, who had given up the very thing which they insist so strenuously on being preserved: and which infallibly must restore the naval power of France, which they ardently desire to have suppressed. If I might presume to give a man advice who thinks himself deservedly to be considered above his sovereign, I would advise you no longer to swim with this city friend upon your back now the stream begins to run so strong against you. He may be safely shaken off without danger of drowning; for though his component particles are extremely heavy, he will swim very buoyant, like a brass kettle, from the hollowness of his formation; and you may at any time take him up again in conformity to your principle of quitting and resuming all things as they answer your present purpose.

But it is no wonder that you should acquiesce with permitting the French to enjoy the privilege of fishing, when by your conduct that commerce is already almost ruined, and must inevitably be so at the return of peace. By the neglect of proper convoys that trade which must naturally have increased by the exclusion of the French, had it been protected; is greatly reduced below

low what it was in peace, and when the present enemy participated therein. In consequence of this deficiency of fish to supply the markets of Spain, Portugal and Italy, the Norwegians have desisted from making stock-fish and prepared their cod in the Newfoundland manner, to furnish what the above realms demanded. By this event we, who at great expence, are obliged to repair to Newfoundland, can no longer vie with those northern people, who catch their fish on their own coasts at less than one quarter of the charges of Englishmen. This, Sir, is a stronger reason than has ever been capable of being brought for excluding the French from Newfoundland, because they will otherwise not only enjoy a trade which we must lose, but possess that nursery of seamen which we must want. The religion of France requires a supply of fish, and the government can support it by prohibiting all other nations from bringing it to their ports. The English require no such food, and must seek distant markets; and these are rescinded by the cheapness of the Norwegian commodity. Notwithstanding all these objections, you consented to establish our enemies in their ancient privileges, and added the island of St. Pierre thereto, of ten time times more importance

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than your boasted conquest of Belleisle, a conquest, the value of which the French must be better acquainted with than you, and which they tell you you may keep without any consideration in return. Were not the lives and treasure of England gloriously lavished on so ridiculous an acquisition?

Of all our conquests then, what were there proposed to be reserved without invalidating the advantages which might have been acquired therefrom. Your consent to a negro trade reduced the conquest of Senegal to little worth. The grant of St. Pierre annihilated, the value of subduing Cape-Breton. Guadalupe was to be given up. The Neutral Islands were to be divided, and the conquest of Canada was to remain entire. A conquest which by rendering the back settlements of our colonies secure, must have naturally allured our countrymen in England to desert their native soil, immense taxes, and the payment of rents for other mens lands, for other climes, where they could have others of their own unincumbered and unembarrassed: and, as the oppressions in trade must necessarily increase the difficulties of artisans and manufacturers, they too would be induced to pass into those climates where every thing is produced which is necessary for their employment, and the means
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of living more easily acquired; and in this manner and by your ministry, the mother country must speedily have been undone by the independance of her daughter colonies. And to all these inconveniencies and injuries you would have submitted for the sake of the king of Prussia and our German allies, had the French acquiesced in what was proposed on that head. Certainly, Sir, after this you cannot avoid laughing at the sound of patriot minister, when it salutes your ears from the giddy mob, whom your extravagances have reduced to drink one half small beer in their porter, and who are too ignorant to perceive that your conduct is the cause of it.

One thing still remains to be spoken of, and that is commencing hostilities with Spain, which you advised in a manner so contrary to the laws of nations. It is not to be doubted but the articles in the public papers, wherein the affair of the Antigallian is mentioned, form one part of your reasons for the counsel which you gave. I imagine few sober men will agree that such things can justify so abrupt an attack: and if they can, I would ask you on what account they were so easily and so silently passed by at the time of their commission: and why you afforded so little assistance to

the owners of the above privateer in recovering their prize. As to the demands which were made by Spain, concerning the privilege of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, and the English settlements in the bay of Honduras, these, it is evident from the Historical Memorial, were relinquished, and therefore could afford no cause of advising the commencement of hostilities, in so unwarrantable a manner, at this moment.

And now, Sir, since Spain afforded you no sufficient cause for the counsel which you gave: since the motives which you have assigned for your resignation have been proved to be fallacious; let me be permitted to guess at the reasons of your retirement. To me it appears that the same all-sufficiency which has rendered all your preparations so defective, had reduced you to a situation from which you saw no way of extricating yourself without disgrace; that instead of finding yourself secured from our enemies by the victories of our arms, you found yourself environed with difficulties by the concessions which you had made in the negociations for peace; and that such terms must inevitably have stripped you of all your popular fame and merit of our successes, had they passed into a treaty.

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Conscious of this truth, you entered on the resolution of advising a breach with Spain : and, having proved the folly of assisting the Germans with our armies, of recalling the remainder which is yet unstarved, and of sending them to be calcined on the shores of Spanish America, in order either to supply your tyrannic spirit of power, with fresh means of being exercised, and of freeing you from the embarrassments, into which your ignorance of negotiating had plunged you ; if the king and council should agree thereto : or if the hardiness of the proposition should determine them not to acquiesce therein, to take that occasion of giving up the seals, before the black clouds of national resentment should break in thunder upon your head ; concluding, undoubtedly, that his majesty might bestow, at that time, what the people's displeasure might have opposed in a future. Is this, though speaking, it cannot be called a bargain, for forsaking the public, an action of a less culpable nature ? And, pray Sir, wherein consists the great injury that has been done you ? or how is your character so infamously traduced, by supposing you have forsaken your post for a bargain ? you who have so repeatedly forsaken your former sentiments to promote your interest. There is indeed one thing

thing in which I agree with you, that however spontaneous this boon may have been in his majesty, it was unmerited in you; and though your city friend is pleased to consider an annuity of three thousand a year to you, your lady, and your son, in succession, and the ennobling of your family, as objects that can scarce bear the name of a reward; yet, to me, the goodness of his majesty appears amazing, who has bestowed such ample remuneration, on a man, whom all good subjects must have applauded him for dismissing with disdain, after he had so insolently refused to continue in the administration longer than he could govern his king and the whole kingdom.

Surely, Sir, you have forgotten these innumerable declamations, which you have so often and so vehemently pronounced against a sole minister, and the evils which resulted therefrom: and which might be brought in this place, to embarrass any countenance but your own; and appal the heart of every man, but such as he that conceives that the absurdest contradictions are reconciled, because he dares to commit them.

Ingratitude has been long and justly attributed to you; and, certainly, it is an astonishing instance thereof, that, after hav-
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ing accepted the above reward, you could so meanly, if not maliciously, by a letter, written to be published, insinuate, that the council, many of whom have never been impeached in their integrity nor understanding, others whom you have applauded to the skies, when you adopted their measures, and, I am afraid, that his majesty himself, are not to be intrusted with the honour of the crown and the interest of the nation.--- This, if it be not rebellion, you will be pleased to find a name for.

Nor is the king alone the only object of your ingratitude ; you have in this very letter treated your best friend with like injustice, even credulity, than whom no man ever had a faster friend. Was it not owing to her influence, that the most glaring contradictions have been thought right in you ; that our successes in war have been attributed to the excellence of your ministry ; that it was believed, the expedition against Rochfort was not defeated by your means ; and that the Viper sloop was not large enough to carry two pieces of paper ; that German measures were wrong and right, just as you opposed or adopted them ; that trade was never so flourishing, though money was never so scarce ; that you were a man of
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profound intellect, though your answers, orders and letters, are hardly common sense and common English; and lastly, that you were the best of patriots, who in treating on peace, had agreed to give up almost all we had acquired by war.

And now, Sir, permit me to say, though your ministry is at an end, the mischief of it continues; your concessions concerning peace have left a grievous embarrassment on the succeeding administration, and almost precluded the power of concluding hostilities on more favourable terms. And certain it is, that whatever may be disadvantageous, when tranquility returns, a great part thereof is justly to be ascribed to your conduct: and this, notwithstanding your vapouring city friend, has told us, in his answer, that you are ready to warn the crew of rocks and quicksands, and to assist in bringing the ship through the storm into a safe harbour. But, I imagine, Sir, that you, the commander, who had brought the ship into such distress, and deserted her, at that moment, with one of the crew, indeed he is not one of the ablest hands, will never be recalled to assist what you have so absurdly conducted, and so arrogantly abandoned.

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Having, in this manner, laid before you, and the people, what may suffice to teach humility to any man but yourself, and to instruct them in the true state of your merits and capacity. I shall take the liberty of recapitulating the most striking particulars of your ministry. In military affairs, fortune, the bravery of our commanders and their troops, and the folly of the enemy, have supplied the means of victory, in which your preparations were manifestly deficient. In consequence of these incidental advantages, commerce has encreased; the profits thereof, and immense sums besides, have been, by you, squandered in Germany. The nation is now encumbered with a debt of fifty millions more than when you first received the seals, and exhausted of almost half the bullion which it possessed at that time. And, lastly, you had agreed, that the acquisitions, which have been made by the bravery of Englishmen, should be trucked for German lands; and that all the advantages of our victories should be given up, excepting one half of the Neutral Islands and Canada, in favour of German mercenaries, who are not by any treaty intitled to such stipulations, particularly when you might have retained every thing that has been acquired by our arms, had you declined from

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officially interposing yourself in favour of German princes ; for to this the French proposed to agree.

Will then the possession and trade of Canada, and the Neutral Islands, compensate for the interest of that money we have run in debt to acquire them ? do such conditions of peace afford a just basis for national exultation in the excellence of your ministry ? Does such conduct offer an object worthy the lamentation of the city of London, because you have resigned ? is it adequate in advantage to the lives and treasure you have wasted, and the taxes you have been the author of imposing ? does it countenance a belief that no other man could have equalled you in the government of the state ? are we not in a worse condition than when you first advanced yourself to the ministry ? can the man who has so frequently contradicted himself, sacrificed thousands of his countrymen, wasted millions of our treasures offered to give up the conquests of their hands, to redeem those territories which he has so frequently asserted would prove the destruction of England, and then deserted his post, because of such concessions, deserve the name of a patriot minister ? what apology will you make for exciting the seditious acclamations of the populace

pulace in your praise, even in the face of that sovereign, by whom you have been so undeservedly rewarded? Such are the true acts of your humility! Whatever you may answer, from my soul I speak it, I think the nation happy in being freed before it is absolutely undone, from the administration of a man, who, with extravagance, hitherto unexampled, has reduced it to a more deplorable condition than at the beginning of his power. And I felicitate the best of kings, in being emancipated from an overbearing minister, whose affected humility served only to augment the insupportableness of his insolence, and which, mixed with the unlimited lust of domineering, like pretended sanctity therewith, amongst the fanatics of old, considering the different genius of the times, forms a character the most analogous to that of the rebels against Charles the first, which hath since that time existed.

Such, Sir, are the circumstances relative to you, which I think the duty and allegiance that I owe my king and country, will justify me in publishing to the world, particularly at this time, when the conduct of the corporation of the city of London, and the readiness of others to follow their inflammatory example, so evidently evince

their preference of a despotic minister, to their fealty for their lawful sovereign; a sovereign than whom no prince hath ever given less cause for being treated so indignantly, and whose virtues should have placed him on the throne, had the kingdom been elective.

I am sensible, Sir, you have constantly affected a most sovereign contempt for all writers on political subjects, when they have made against you. And yet, as I imagine you may read this Letter, and by the time you arrive to this part may possibly conceive yourself no greater than a king; and therefore, not exempted from advice, I shall take the liberty of counseling you to have the gout all this winter at Hayes. At least, not to vociferate any more, after such repeated tergiversation, against ministers, whom you have so often declared to be wise men and fools, honest men and knaves, according as they coincided with, or opposed your sentiments. Certainly, the
 - - - - - will turn aside when you shall presume to praise his majesty whom you have tacitly slandered for declining your measures and refusing to walk in your leading strings, and will wonder at the internal fabric of that mind which can presume to treat them and their understandings with such contempt;
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but it seems this advice will come too late to be totally observed. You have already with that unembarrassed countenance of which you alone are master, despised the intellect of men of double your capacity, transferred the blame of all you have done amiss, relative to the treaty of peace, on others, and asserted that America had been conquered in Germany. Does this quaint conception proceed from your own ignorance, or a contempt for the knowledge of other men? In support of these round assertions you have offered no argument; for of those you never knew any thing: declamation, fiery declamation forms your oratoric merit, an admirable qualification for a statesman, whose actions ought to be governed by reason, and totally divested of rant.

I would ask you whether America had been conquered if the navy of England had been unemployed in preventing succours from France. Surely, our men of war were not cruizing on the continent of Europe: and without that obstruction France at all times contains an army equal to her designs on Germany, and to the defence of Canada: and your sending troops to that part had no other tendency than to promote that insufficiency

ciency of armament, which has accompanied your other expeditions.

As to your city friend, I hope, he will continue to rush into absurdities, assert what he cannot prove, prate of what he does not understand, and blunder in the little which he does. Such speeches will always be acceptable as long as the muscles of the human face are capable of risibility. And here I can not but remark the singularity of your choice in this object of your friendship ; a man the most improper to be near the ear of a minister, vain, empty, and romantic ; the very Will a wisp of all misguiding counsel, blustering for his country, whilst selfishness excludes all patriot sensations from his heart ; roaring for liberty in the midst of the most tyrannic exercise of power, wherever he can shew it ; dictating in subjects which he has not faculties to comprehend ; and whom alone, in this money-loving age, the greatest riches have not been able to preserve from universal contempt.


Sure such an alliance has never been concluded between two subjects, since that of the gentleman usher and physician in the Rehearsal : and pray, would not you have done well to have followed their example in whispering your sentiments to each other,

other, and not have published them to the world?

Enjoy your pension, Sir, and reduce yourself to the condition of a subject in your own imagination. I am too old to enjoy court favours, not yet reduced to the second childishness of desiring them, and at length happy in seeing the propitious hour arrived in which to serve my king and country, are one and the same thing. And as long as my feeble hand can move a pen, so long shall my best endeavours be exerted to defend my sovereign against the malevolent attacks of insolence and insidiousness, from whatever quarter they may proceed.

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